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FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PRocEDuRE. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office.
1941. Pp. viii, 474. $.50.
IT may be only coincidence that it was in February, 1939, that the President
became "greatly impressed" with the Attorney General's statement of Decem-
ber, 1938, that there was need for procedural reform in administrative law
and that it was in January, 1939, between the Attorney General's communi-
cation and the President's reply that the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association approved the bill,' drafted by its Committee on Adminis-
trative Law, which became the Walter-Logan bill.2 Whether or not tile
relationship of these events in point of time is coincidental, their relationship
is nevertheless highly significant in its influence upon the report produced
by the Committee which the Attorney General established upon the Presi-
dent's suggestion.
The principal draftsman and exponent of the Walter-Logan bill was 0. R.
McGuire, a disciple of the late James M. Beck whose whole approach to
the subject of administrative law consisted of hysterical denunciation.8 Despite
the transparency of the Beck-McGuire frenzy, McGuire was able, in the
course of over five years of dogged maneuvering, to utilize the American
Bar Association to build up a very considerable political pressure for the
enactment of a fantastic bill. The fact that the bill was actually passed by
Congress and failed to become law only because of the President's veto
has, in some degree, operated to lend dignity to it and to obscure the fact
that its provisions were so completely ridiculous that had they dealt with
a subject familiar to the electorate it is inconceivable that the bill would
have been seriously entertained.
If the Walter-Logan bill were a live issue today, I would, of course, not
seek to oppose it merely by characterization; but by the painstaking analyses
of others the validity of my summary description has been established4 and
it is described here only because its pendency furnished the political context
in which the report under review was prepared. This is not to say that the
work of the Committee is a political stratagem - far from it. The Attorney
General got together a committee which included some of the ablest and
most astute and best informed practitioners, judges and teachers in the
administrative law field. The committee utilized the services of a small but
1. For a summary of the development of the bill see Landis, Crucial Issues in
Adinistrative Law (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 1082, n. 10.
2. See H. R. 4236, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); see also S. 915 and H. R. 6324,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
3. See BEC, OUR ,VONDFMAND OF BUnP..TCatCV (1932) passim, reviewed by
Hart in (1932) 46 HARv. L. REv. 173.
4. See Landis, supra note 1, and articles cited therein.
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exceptionally able staff under the direction of Professor Walter Gelhorn,
which set about carefully and methodically to make a scholarly analysis of
the actual workings of the various federal administrative agencies. I do not
believe that there could be any serious quarrel with the assertion that the
series of 27 monographs embodying the work of the staff constitutes the
greatest informational and analytical contribution yet made to administrative
law in this country.
Having supplied itself with the most adequate data ever available for the
study of administrative law, the Committee might have been expected to
address itself to fundamentals and to contribute a monumental product. It
might have considered whether there really is such a thing as what is called
the "administrative process" or whether the term is merely the label attached
to all functions of government that do not fit the three compartments into
which we have assumed all governmental activity must inherently be divisible.
That the Committee almost came to the point of thinking about such things
is indicated early in the report: "Congress has enacted statutes, and it has
resorted to the administrative device in the framing of statutes, in the prac-
tical effort to meet particular needs." But that they did not quite arrive
at this point is disclosed in the next sentence: "Because the administrative
process has developed in this fashion, it invites comprehensive study with
a view to coordination and improvement." 6 I should suppose that if one
thought the matter through, he would at least have to give consideration to
the proposition that because what is called the administrative process has
developed in this fashion it defies comprehensive study, and coordination is
no improvement.
But even if it be assumed that there must be an administrative process or
there would not be a Committee studying it, at least it is to be expected
that such a committee would make an independent analysis of what the
process is. It is at this point that the report is particularly disappointing
and it is here that the political context in which the report was prepared
becomes especially significant. Thus, since the technique by which support
was mustered for the Walter-Logan bill involved a representation that the
bill provided for the more expeditious settlement of disputes with the Govern-
ment, the Committee report considers the advantages to be gained by dele-
gation of authority within agencies and by encouragement of informal dis-
positions of matters. Again, since it was alleged that the citizen is kept in
the dark as to what his rights are and how they are determined, the Com-
mittee report considers the desirability of giving publicity to agency struc-
ture, regulations, procedures and decisions, and of making declaratory rulings.
Since rule-making and adjudication had been subjects of particular assault,
a large part of the report is devoted to these subjects. And since the political
atmosphere in which the Committee sat included pressure for the extension
of the area and scope of judicial review of administration, the Committee
gives us its views upon that subject, although, be it noted, judicial review





No doubt it will be said that these comments are captious; that when
the body politic bestirs itself about particular alleged abuses, it is with the
greatest propriety than an inquiry such as this be directed to the allegations
that are current and be guided by the objective of finding out whether the
allegations have substance or are purely imaginary. I would be more im-
pressed with this line of thinking if I were not so completely convinced that
the body politic did not bestir itself at all and that the tremor which was
perceived was simply generated by fanatics and given momentum by those
opposed to the policies which Congress had directed that certain agencies
should carry out.7 Suppose, though, that I have in this respect wholly mis-
conceived the situation and that guidance of the inquiry by the allegations
was eminently proper. Nevertheless, the first contribution of such a com-
mittee ought to be the establishment of demonstrably valid standards of
judgment, and this demands, first of all, searching inquiry as to whether
there really is anything which can be called the administrative process, and
if so what it is, what it is supposed to accomplish and how.
The lack of any such searching analysis is exposed by more detailed
examination of the Committee's findings mid recommendations vith respect
to the several issues that have been outlined. 8 The necessity for delegation
of authority within agencies is predicated by the Committee upon their size,
their responsibility for results, and the variety of their duties. Having found
that in some agencies there is hesitancy to delegate by reason of doubt as
to the authority to delegate, the Committee recommends a blanket enlarge-
ment of powers in this respect. Since the number of agencies in which
enlargement of such powers is required is relatively small, it is a little
puzzling to find no evidence that consideration was given to the alternative
of giving legislative attention to the specific requirements or that such an
alternative was rejected for persuasive reasons. However, the proposal is
at least harmless and no one could charge the Committee with serious error
in its handling of this subject. The interesting things are the fact that the
subject was considered and the nature of the consideration given.
Delegation of authority is, of course, an important matter in any large
organization whether business, industrial, executive or administrative. Its
effective utilization in an infinite variety of circumstances challenges the
imagination of the ablest executive. In an administrative agency it usually
generates problems of administrative procedure, but it is not itself a matter
of administrative procedure but rather of managerial technique. It involves
decisions upon such vital questions as whether, and to what extent, pro-
fessional or expert personnel is to be used in the direct conduct of operations
and the extent to which professional or expert service units are to render
special services to operating units without directly conducting operations.
Such decisions, in turn, are largely determinative of the type of personnel
to be employed and the means appropriate to controlling the exercise of
delegated authority. Control of delegated authority is not merely a matter
7. See Landis, supra note 1, at 10S9.
. The following discussion is addressed exclusively to the report of the whole com-
mittee. Additional views were expressed by four members of the Committee and
further additional views by one of these four.
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of the extent of delegation and the scope of direct supervision and review;
instead it requires choice among a great variety of available means for col-
lateral control. Again, the difference between efficiency and inefficiency may
depend upon whether, to carry out a given job, it is better to delegate
responsibility for the entire job to a unit or whether the work can be more
effectively and expeditiously done by delegating parts to several units, each
to some degree specialized.
In the face of such intricate and delicate problems the Committee cavalierly
tells us that internal management should be delegated to an executive offi-
cer,0 that subordinates should handle routine matters, that responsible officers
should be authorized to make informal dispositions and settlements and to
initiate formal proceedings, and that the exercise of delegated power can be
controlled by stating formulated policies, by agency consideration of the
novel and difficult cases, and by requiring periodic reports, on the issuance
of complaints. How the Committee could possibly have dealt with the sub-
ject of delegation enlighteningly, I frankly do not know. What interests
me is why the Committee felt called upon to give ex cathedra expression to
a few cliches upon a subject with which it was obviously not able to deal
and the only answer I can find is that a bill was pending "for the more
expeditious settlement of disputes."
The recommendations for distribution of information have already been
summarized. Here again the central problem- just what practical devices
can be utilized to see that affected interests actually get the specific informa-
tion they need when they need it- is not even faced but is simply stated
in a footnote.10 Technical due process may be satisfied by "making available"
the type of information the Committee indicates, but certainly many func-
tions of government, such as social insurance, for example, are not made
effective through the availability of information which, as a practical matter,
affected interests will never see. I have no doubt that the work of the
Committee's staff would have been easier if all agencies had available the
several types of information that are pointed out, but I suggest that the
generalized proposals of the Committee are inappropriate unless accompanied
by some demonstration of who will use such information in what agencies
and how.
The Committee is fascinated with the device of declaratory rulings and
recommends legislation authorizing all agencies to issue them. A fairly con-
9. There is no indication that the Committee is at all aware of the complex and
subtle problems of staff relationships that are inherent in this process.
10. Footnote 3, p. 26, states: "It may not be wholly amiss to add here the thought
that no agency can know in advance the identity of every affected interest or every
attorney who may at some time be involved in its proceedings. Hence, those who may
be interested must themselves bear the major responsibility for securing the informa-
tion an agency may make available. It is no doubt true even today that accessible
documentary material is often not consulted because of failure to seek it from one or
another of the agencies. Many law libraries, both those of professional organizations
and those connected with educational or public institutions, neglect to index or to main-
tain current files of administrative materials which may be obtained from the agencies
at little or no cost."
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vincing showing is made for the utility of the device in the specific instances
discussed, and the majority -unlike the minority -has by a purely per-
missive recommendation, protected itself against the charge of compelling
the declarations in situations that are inappropriate. But by the same stroke
the Committee protected itself against the necessity of making any detailed
inquiry as to what functions of the so-called administrative process would
be advanced and what functions retarded by declaratory rulings. Certainly
it is not alien to our common-law and public-law concepts that there are areas
of human relationships in which the intervention of governmental authority
is a last resort and in which it is a deliberate policy that persons approach
the brink of illegality at their own risk. I conceive this to be true of at
least some phases of such legislation as the National Labor Relations Act;
it is for this reason that declaratory rulings are inappropriate in such fields
and not merely, as the Committee says, because it is a "complex, shifting
problem" in which the "intrusion of variables may distort or destroy the
plans concerning which the ruling was intended to give guidance.""1 The
declaratory ruling is a comparatively new technique of administration whose
careful development may be a substantial contribution. Had the Committee
given real thought to what the various functions and policies of government
are in which administrative agencies are utilized it might have been able to
shed valuable light upon the relationship of this particular technique to those
functions and policies.
In its handling of the subject of administrative adjudication the report
reaches its lowest point. The Committee is fully aware of the fact (and
demonstrates the propriety of it) that the great bulk of administrative adjudi-
cation is informally done; it is further aware that these adjudications are
of a great variety of types for a great variety of purposes under a great
variety of circumstances and bear varying relationships to formal adjudi-
cation and other activities of administration. From this, one might have
expected the conclusion that the presence of certain formalities in certain
phases of adjudication affords no basis for appraising those phases in isola-
tion from the remainder of the particular governmental function being carried
out, nor for generalizing about such phases collectively. But at this point
the Committee virtually ignores the fact that much formal adjudication is in
the nature of appellate review of informal adjudication,'- selects the trial-
examiner type of proceeding as representative, pays lip-service to the fact
that issues and purposes in formal proceedings do differ, and proceeds to
model its recommendations upon the situation in which an agency is charg-
ing private parties with violation of law or regulations and part of the agency
staff is trying to prove the violation to another part of the staff - the object
"of the epithet "prosecutor-judge combination." The Committee disavows
complete separation of functions because of the necessity for unified responsi-
bility and for some integration with other processes of administration. But
11. P. 32.
12. Evidently the exception of "agency tribunals" from the application of Title III
of the Committee's proposed bill is intended to take cognizance of this problem, but
the definition of the term renders the exception ineffective, for there are appellate reiew
tribunals which are not "agency tribunals" as defined in the bill.
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it suggests the use of "Hearing Commissioners" instead of trial examiners;
these "commissioners" are supposed to be endowed with some mystic quality
called "independence" by being appointed for seven-year terms by an Office
of Federal Administrative Procedure (upon nomination of the agency) and
being paid $7500 per year. The situations in which such officers are to be
used are described in the bill proposed by the Committee, not in terms of
the "prosecutor-judge combination" which it was obviously devised to fit,
but in terms of proceedings "wherein rights, duties or other legal relations
are required by law to be determined after opportunity for hearing, and, if
a hearing be held, only upon the basis of a record made in the course of
such hearing." The language is very ambiguous, but it probably includes
a number of appellate review procedures as well as other proceedings in
which no part of the agency is in any way a party to the controversy being
adjudicated.
The nature of the "independence" which these "commissioners" are sup-
posed to have is not at all clear. The arrangement is an obvious compromise
which cannot represent anyone's consistent thinking. If there are admin-
istrative proceedings in which the Committee is convinced that the agency
is really in controversy with private parties such independence is not enough;
for no agency can provide an appropriate forum for the resolution of a con-
troversy with itself no matter what selection, salary, or tenure may be
provided for the employees who hear the evidence and make the initial
decision. But the existence of such a controversy cannot be inferred merely
from the issuance in the name of the agency of a moving paper called a
complaint and from the designation of a staff member to present the evidence
and argunient in support of the facts alleged. It may be that in many such
proceedings there is an illusion of controversy with the agency, to the detri-
ment of public confidence, by reason of the trial attorney's activities; it may
be that in such cases a more accurate perspective would be maintained if
the examiner himself were charged with the function of investigation and
of arranging that all relevant evidence is presented, but without getting into
the position of advocating a particular conclusion. Or it may be that agencies
have in some cases had staff members developing and presenting cases where
the responsibility for that activity would better have been left to private
parties urging opposing conclusions upon the agency. These are the kind of
questions I should like to have seen the Committee explore. But their explora-
tion requires consideration of each procedure individually, analyzing what
is really in issue, how the issues are related to the governmental functions
for which the agency is responsible, what processes of proof are feasible
and expectable, and what devices are available for distinguishing clearly,
one from the other, controversy between private parties, controversy with
the agency, and opposition to the Congressional policy which the agency is
charged with effectuating.
The Committee's discussion of administrative rule-making is a valuable
summary of the history and purposes of this subject, the types of rules in
use and the utility of available techniques by which the agencies may acquire
the information for fair and effective rule-making. I believe it oversimplifies
the distinction between "legally binding regulations" and "interpretative regu-
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lations," for it is my observation that they merge into each other on many
occasions. This classification also overlooks the fact that regulations which
are procedural or interpretative in form may be adopted to achieve a sub-
stantive affirmative effect in carrying out agency policy. Finally, when we
come to the legislative recommendation - that regulations be given a deferred
effective date unless circumstances require otherwise - the existence of in-
terpretative regulations is apparently forgotten. Such regulations are gener-
ally retroactive in operation, no matter what effective date is stated, and the
statement of a future effective date is misleading.
In its discussions of judicial review- both of adjudication and of rule-
making- the report reaches its highest point of quality. I will not be so
ungenerous as to suggest that this may be due to the fact that this subject
has received extensive and thoughtful treatment previously, or to the fact
that this is a subject with which members of the Committee have had greater
experience than with administrative procedure; and I hope readers will not
be so ungenerous as to suggest that my estimate of the quality of these sec-
tions of the report is due to the fact that upon this subject the Committee's
recommendation is to let well enough alone.
I have, of course, not done justice to the report as a whole. It is a useful
summary of materials from the various staff monographs -though not so
useful as the monographs themselves, nor as useful as a document written
expressly as a summary and coordination of the monograph material would
have been. I have had to deal critically with various approaches, recom-
mendations, and conclusions in an effort to indicate the sort of contribution
the Committee might have made but did not. I believe that their failure to
make an outstanding contribution can be attributed to an unfortunate political
atmosphere which impelled them to treat ready-made issues which obscured
fundamentals.
LESTER P. SCHOENE-1
CORPORATE DIVIDENDS, LEGAL AND ACCOUNTING PROBLEMS PERTAINING TO
CORPORATE DISTRIBUTION. By Donald Kehl. New York: The Ronald
Press, 1941. Pp. xi, 367. $7.50.
Tnis brief survey of some of the problems of dividend law is addressed to
corporate directors, accountants, and lawyers. In his preface Mr. Kehl says
that he has made a careful analysis of the evolution of the current dividend
statutes in each of the forty-eight states, and has put emphasis upon the
statutes rather than the decided cases. He says that he has sought to interpret
the statutes in the light of accounting practices and to harmonize accounting
and legal principles.
This is indeed an ambitious project for so brief a work of some 350 pages,
only the first 150 pages of which are devoted to dividend statutes and the
classification and interpretation of their dividend restrictions. It is unfor-
t General Counsel, Railroad Retirement Board.
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tunate that more of the book was not devoted to this topic. The last 200
pages of the book are devoted to a somewhat cursory treatment of a variety
of legal topics more or less connected with dividends. These topics, which
are much less troubled by the complexities of statutory construction, include
the revocation of declared dividends, the dividend rights of non-cumulative
preferred shares, the liability of directors and shareholders for illegal divi-
dends, the effect of the sale of assets, merger or consolidation upon the surplus
of the constituent corporations which was available for dividends, and the
somewhat irrelevant topic of the effect of federal income taxes on dividends.
Strange to say, there is no separate chapter dealing with capital stock and
the evolution of the concept of legal capital, although this subject receives
incidental treatment.
The most interesting as well as the most controversial discussion appears
in the first part of the book dealing with the tests of the funds available
for dividends-the surplus test, the net profits test, and the computation
of the amounts available under these tests. Rather than attempt an evalua-
tion of the book as a whole, the reviewers feel that they can render the best
service to prospective readers by concentrating upon certain points in the first
part of the book, the treatment of which they find unsatisfactory. These
points are (1) a failure to work out or expound clearly the true concept
of legal capital in the light of legislative policy and the history of statutory
development as interpreted by the courts; (2) an inflexible assumption that
all the words in a dividend statute, and especially the word "profits," when
used with other words, must be given some significance; (3) an insistence
on the idea of current profits as an alternative source of dividends whenever
the word "profits" is coupled with the word "surplus"; and (4) the advocacy
of certain interpretations of terms and accounting practices which tend to
produce uncertainty as to the basis for determining legality of dividends
and to defeat the policy of the law of providing security for creditors. In
order to bring out the delusive tendencies in the author's treatment of
statutes and charters it is necessary to argue some of his points more than
is customary in a book review.
The author recognizes that "the capital impairment rule has long been
the backbone of American dividend law."' But he finds a very strange
uncertainty as to what is the measure of the legal capital called for and
whether there is any definite figure to place on the balance sheet as the capital
which determines the surplus from which dividends may be paid. In his
opinion, no certain measure appeared until the most recent statutory revisions.
He suggests three alternative possibilities as to the meaning of capital stock
in the sense of legal capital: (1) the actual dollar value of the consideration
received upon the issue of shares, even though the shares were flagrantly
watered on original issuance; (2) the par or stated value of the issued shares
(which has generally been assumed to be the measure) ; and (3) the actual
amount of capital at the opening of the current accounting period, i.e., in
case of impairment, the capital as "reduced" or impaired by prior losses.2
1. Pp. 4, 11, 12, 15, 24, 28, 41.
2. Pp. 28, 29, 42, 46, 50, 51, 131.
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Mr. Kehl seems to favor the first alternative measure of capital, although
he seems not to disapprove of the third, which bears a strong resemblance
to the peculiar English doctrines on this subject. His idea of legal capital
is entirely out of line with all the modem statutory definitions of "stated
capital," which may well be regarded essentially as formulations of what
has always been regarded as legal capital.
The New York dividend statute of 1825, as the author points out,3 has
exerted wider influence than any other statute on the development of Ameri-
can dividend legislation. The language of the New York Act, the father or
grandfather of many others, provides that:
"It shall not be lawful for the directors or managers . . . to
make dividends excepting from the surplus profits arising from the
business . . . ; and it shall not be lawful for the directors . . .
to divide, withdraw, or in any way pay to the stockholders . . .
any part of the capital stock."
The author makes the astonishing assertion that in many states which
derive their law from this old New York Act, it is still an open question
whether the statutes authorize the payment of dividends from annual net
profits even though capital is impaired and whether capital deficits of prior
accounting periods need be made up out of subsequent earnings. He believes
that the "antecedent background of the New York Act" shows the original
intention to have been to authorize such payment despite a capital impair-
ment, and he believes that "from the economic standpoint this is the sound
approach."1
4
This section of the old New York statute was very clearly construed by
Earl, J. in the case of Williams v. Westcrn Union Telcgraph Company5
where the purpose and policy of the statute as to creation and maintenance
of the property capital were fully expounded. The court declared that the
policy of the statute was the creation and maintenance of a property capital
"to the extent required by the charter" and that whatever property the
corporation has up to that limit must be regarded as capital stock. When
its property exceeds that limit, then the excess is surplus.0
Formerly, corporation laws required all the authorized shares to be sub-
scribed and issued at full par value before the commencement of business.
Hence, the charter itself prescribed a legal capital fixed at the aggregate
par value of the authorized shares (a sum in dollars fixed by the certificate
of incorporation or charter). This full contribution was the required sub-
stitute for individual liability and established the legal limit on distributions.
Now that the full authorized amount of capital need not be raised, the capital
limit on distributions remains the aggregate par value of the shares issued,
3. Pp. 11, 12.
4. Pp. 50, 51.
5. 93 N. Y. 162 (1883).
6. In other New York cases the term "chartered capital" is sometimes used. See
Roberts v. Roberts-Wicks Co., 184 N. Y. 257, 266, 77 N. E. 13, 16 (190); Randall
v. Bailey, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 173, 181 (Sup. Ct., 1st Dep't 1940) and cases cited; (1940)
50 YALE L. J. 306, 309.
19411 REVIEWS 1507
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
not the actual value of the consideration received on the issuance of the
shares. For it has been uniformly held that when a corporation goes forth
into the business world it is supposed to have a capital at least equal to the
par value of its issued shares. Creditors have a right to rely on the assump-
tion that the par value of the shares has been fully paid and that the property
taken in payment has been accepted at a fair valuation.
The author's lack of understanding of the concept of legal or stated capital
is shown by his denial that the corporation is under any duty whatsoever
to restore prior losses of capital out of subsequent earnings.7 He asserts
that there can be no "division" of capital which the corporation did not
receive in the first instance (due to a fictitious payment) or which has been
dissipated by losses in a prior accounting period. But, as indicated in his
own illustration of a "bin of assets," legal capital is not something received;
it is rather like a mark or gauge on the side of a bin or reservoir of assets
fixed at a certain minimum figure by the law. If the assets are equal to or
below that figure, they are covered by the capital limitation and restricted
against withdrawal. Only the excess or amount above the mark is surplus
which may be withdrawn. It is not necessary to have a statutory provision
requiring that profits be appropriated to make good a deficit of capital because
the legal capital measure automatically covers all values below the capital
amount in the reservoir of assets and all funds that come into the treasury
become at once capital until there is an excess over the capital mark. The
result is thai in spite of gains by income there will be no net profits, but only
a smaller deficit.9 The author's ideas indeed seem to be drawn from the
peculiar British theory of capital which has been regarded as inapplicable
in this country.10 .Ideas such as that impairment of asset capital "reduces"
the legal capital, that a corporation may, for accounting purposes, start at
the beginning of each year or other accounting period with a new legal
capital so impaired and that such a possibility is left open under many
American statutes, seem to result almost entirely from a failure to observe
the development and doctrine of American statutes concerning this reduction
of capital.
The question of the effect of stock watering on the right of a corporation
to pay dividends without making up the initial deficit of legal capital presents
some conflict in the decisions." The author takes much too seriously the
7. Pp. 51, 52, 228.
8. P. 28; see Ballantine and Hills, Corporate Capital and Restrictions Upon Dhii-
dends under Modern Corporationr Law (1935) 23 CALIF. L. REV. 229, 234.
9. See National Newark & Essex Banking Co. v. Durant Motor Co., 124 N. J.
Eq. 213, 1 A. (2d) 316 (1938), aff'd, 125 N. J. Eq. 435, 5 A. (2d) 315 (1939) (no
dividends can be paid from "profits" while a deficit remains). Mr. Kehl, however,
disapproves of this case.
10. As to the English theory, see Weiner, Theory of Anglo-American Dividend
Law: The English Cases (1928) 28 CoL. L. REv. 1046, 1056-60; Ballantine and Hills,
supra note 8, at 242; REITER, PROFITs, DIVIDENDS, AND THE LAW (1926) 59-62, 75-84;
SAMUELS; SHAREHOLDERS' MONEY (1933) 146, 149, 347.
11. See Goodnow v. American Writing Paper Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 692, 69 At. 1014
(1908) ; Kehl, pp. 46, 51, 59, 62, 292; Weiner, Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law:
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peculiar case of Goodizow v. American W1riting Paper Company.'- In that case
the value of the present assets exceeded the value of the actual assets with
which the corporation began business. The stock had been issued at a grossly
excessive valuation. The complainant contended that a dividend could not
be paid until the capital deficit -represented by the difference between the
actual value received and the grossly excessive valuation - had been restored.
The Court found that "profits" and "surplus" were alternatives, and that
"capital stock" as used in the statute referred to actual value paid in and
not to par value. It did not decide whether "net profits" meant the net
profits upon the whole of the company's business from its organizatiun ur
the profits of the current year (the difference between gross earnings and
operating expenses for that year), inasmuch as either test would have been
satisfied. Thus, under the Goodnow case, if nothing were paid for watered
stock except blue sky, no margin of assets would be required for creditors
who would be left to bear all the risks of the business. All the current earn-
ings could be frittered away in dividends, although the corporation had
issued shares of large aggregate value.'
3
Under the acts of some states apparent alternatives are provided by
language stating that dividends may be declared out of "surplus" or "net
profits" or "earnings." Often, however, these terms are used in combina-
tion with a prohibition against the impairment, division, or withdrawal of
capital or capital stock, as in the New Jersey statute. In such cases it seems
clear that the terms are used simply as part of the description of earned
surplus so as to include undivided profits which may be carried in a separate
account.14 In only five states are profits of the current or preceding year
clearly specified as an alternative source, despite impairment of capital. In
most of the statutes, however, in which the terms "net profits" or "earnings"
are employed without specifying some particular period for their determina-
tion, they mean accumulated profits or earned surplus and no alternative to
surplus is intended.35 It is very doubtful whether the statutory draftsmen,
who were not accountants, made any distinction between these words, and
it is absurd to deny the possibility of the use of synonyms in statutes, even
American Statutes a;;d Cases (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 461, 468-71: Weiner, TJeo%, of
Anglo-American Dividend Law: Surplus and Profits (1930) 30 CoL. L. Rsv. 330, 346,
347; Ballantine and Hills, supra note 8 at 242. Comments, (1940) 49 Ytr. L J. 492,
507, n. 3; (1937) 31 ILL. L. REv. 670, 674, n. 16.
12. 73 N. J. Eq. 692, 69 At. 1014 (1908). See note 11 supra. He fails to cite the
cases contra.
13. Note that Peters v. U. S. Mortgage Co., 13 Del. Ch. 11, 17, 18, 114 Aft. 593,
601, 602 (1921), which stated erroneously that "capital stock paid in was used in
ascertaining surplus by the New Jersey court" and purported to follow that doctrine
in ascertaining surplus, is now discredited by the present Delaware General Corporation
Law, Section 14, dearly defining the method of determining the amount of capital to
include the aggregate par value of all shares issued.
14. See Ballantine and Hills, supra note 8 at 241, 242.
15. See Cannon v. Wiscassett Mills Co., 195 N. C. 119, 141 S. E. 344 (1928);
11 FL.rcHER, CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed. 1932) §5335; 18 C. J. S. §460-62.
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if such language is surplusage, for frequently different clauses are restate-
ments of the same test.
The author presents the Indiana Corporation Act as an instance in a
modern revision of an "almost unintelligible dividend regulation."1 0  He
first finds supposed "alternatives" of surplus earnings and net profits and
then finds the "enlarging effect" of such alternatives counteracted by an
express provision against capital impairment. It is only by reason of the
author's fixed idea about alternatives and his unwillingness to construe a
statute as a whole that there is any difficulty. The word "or" is a big word
for the author. He calls it a "statutory dichotomy" which "necessitates
making some differentiation between surplus and net profits. '17 He is an
ardent advocate of current profits as the basic concept and of the right to
pay dividends from such profits, even when there is capital impairment
a bias which may color his interpretation of statutes and charters.
The author advocates "double alternatives" to open as many doors or
channels as possible in the bin or reservoir or dike of assets so as to con-
duct assets into the pockets of the shareholders. In fact, he seems to find
triplicate and quadruplicate alternatives or leaks in the dike, by indorsing
lax rules of accounting which do not take account of catastrophic losses on
the profit and loss statement but which recognize the technical possibility
of an earned surplus in the face of a capital deficit, and the theory that
capital stock is automatically reduced by losses. Hence, a corporation may
be going deeper and deeper into the red and still distribute "profits" which
do not come "directly" out of capital. The more a corporation waters its
stock or impairs its capital by losses, the less the required margin of assets
becomes, until it may approach zero, and all protection provided for credi-
tors, present and future, as well as for shareholders, may vanish. And while
the author does not advocate the distribution of profits on particular trans-
actions, he does believe in relying on profits as shown by income statements
for an arbitrary period in preference to balance sheets which present a long
term picture. But it is the opinion of the reviewers that both financial state-
ments ought to be considered in ascertaining the financial condition of the
corporation. Current profits measured by annual income statements ought
not to be, taken as a source of dividends without some further restrictions.
In short, Kehl's Canons of Construction are not conducive to the preserva-
tion of capital funds for creditors. The author raises needless doubts and
views for which little can be said are given greater credence than those which
are generally accepted and for which there is strong authority and policy.
HENRY W. BALLANTINEt
GEORGE S. I"rLLStf
16. Pp. 68, 128.
17. P. 31.
fProfessor of Law, University of California, School of Jurisprudence.
' Member of the New York Bar.
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CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY. By Ray Andrews
Brown. Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1941. Pp. xviii, 563. $5.00.
THIs casebook is intended by Professor Brown, of the University of
Wisconsin, to be used in the first year course in Real Property. Presum-
ably it is to be preceded by the course in Personal Property, and is to be
followed by specialized courses, often elective, such as Rights in Land,
Conveyances, Landlord and Tefiant, and Future Interests.
The book is a study in compression. In 75 pages of clear, terse prose
Professor Brown presents for the beginning student an analysis of basic
concepts and a brief survey of the Feudal system, the common law scheme
of estates, and the famous English statutes. The various possessory estates
are then treated in succession by the conventional use of cases and notes.
The freehold estates (fee simple, fee tail and the various life estates) are
given about 75 pages; the tenancy for years and the lesser tenancies are
given 105 pages; co-tenancies receive more ample treatment in 70 pages;
and future estates require the remaining 225 pages.
After some of the recent ostentatious casebooks, this one might seem thin
and meager. But there is hardly a wasted word. The cases are seldom novel
or colorful. They are not even conspicuously recent, but they are chosen
with great care both for the orderly development of the subject and for
economy of space. The policy followed in preparing the notes is especially
commendable: the citations are not so numerous as to discourage a student,
but every reference is to a case or note or article which would be worth
a student's time to read. One who has himself prepared a casebook in real
property is not likely to find in this book many cases which he wished he
had used, but in observing Professor Brown's sound craftsmanship, he might
well wish that he had taken more time to cut out some or edit others which
be did use.
But the book is too descriptive. There is seldom a provocative clash in
authority -unless, of course, students can be relied upon to read the cases
in the notes. A case is often chosen because the judge has given a neat
historical survey or a "pat" summary of the law. And obviously the narrow
space limits have compelled the editor to leave out much interesting and
important law. Perhaps it is defensible to cut dower down to a few pages
and courtesy to a single case, but the modern statutory substitutes should
be given some space. (Bodner v. Fcit is cited for another point.) The
treatment of the life tenant-remainderman relation could profitably have
been expanded. There is only a brief note on special assessments, and no
treatment of such interesting cases as those in which a remainderman seeks
to share in the sum a life tenant has recovered for permanent injury to the
land or buildings, or in the proceeds of an insurance policy carried by the
life tenant, or in an outstanding interest acquired by the life tenant. The
space allotted to landlord and tenant should, in my judgment, have been
doubled at least. Even if it is conceded that such matters as percentage
leases, security deposits, and the effect of bankruptcy on leases should not
be covered by principal cases, still a note might be included. Dyett v.
Pendleton may be the best case on constructive eviction, and McCullough v.
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Cox as good as any on dependence of covenants in a lease, but they should
not be the only cases reprinted. Many of the best cases are cited in the
notes, but would not class discussions be improved if a few more were
reprinted?
The most serious question is whether the subject of future interests is
entitled to nearly half of the space in a casebook for first year students.
Professor Brown's argument is that since so few students erect the advanced
course in future interests, all students should have a speed course in it.
The treatment here is not merely a survey. It is a full-dress course in
miniature. Some of us have long thought that it was better to give all
students a moderate course in future interests instead of giving a definitive
course to a few. But this seems a case of too little and too soon. In my
judgment this "sneak preview" will not encourage students to take the full
course, nor will it give them sufficient training by itself.
If five or six separate courses in property are to be continued, a book like
99is is a good introduction. Many of us who, as students took two or three
6 the sparate courses, received no clear idea of the law of property as a
whole. Property seems to me the best of all subjects for a "combination
course." But if students are to be permitted to study intensively a few
random fragments of the whole, then a book like this gives them a good
bird's eye view of the whole field - even if many of the topics must be
covered again in later courses.
RUSSELL DErISON NILESt
A QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL ORDER. By Jackson H. Ralston. Washington,
D. C.: John Byrne & Co., 1941. Pp. 205. $2.00.
INTERNATIONAL law and its exponents have not lately, to put it mildly,
been held in high esteem. It must be conceded that even before lawlessness
in the international community became the revered order of the day rather
than the exception, faith in this branch of the legal science stood on a ledge
too narrow for safety. It is, therefore, not surprising that the recent un-
qualified adoption of the "might makes right" theory throughout the world
has resulted in increasing criticism both in volume and in tone. In this
instance, the indictment was drawn up by a guild member who has in the
past made valuable contributions to international law both as a practitioner
and as a writer. Judge Ralston, the author of this book, served at the
beginning of this century as American agent in the Pious Fund case before
the Permanent Court of Arbitration and as Umpire of the Italian-Venezuelan
Claims Commission; he has also written several books which have com-
manded at least th& attention and the respect of students of international
affairs.' Therefore, his attack against what in his opinion is international
t Professor of Law, New York University.
1. DEMaOCRACY'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, reviewed by Professor Borchard in
(1923) 32 YALE L. J. 520; LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, reviewed
by Mr. Frederic R. Coudert in (1927) 36 id. 583; INTERNATIONAL ARiTRATION FRom
ATHENS TO LOCARNO, reviewed by Professor Borchard in (1931) 40 id. 835.
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"law" by courtesy only (p. 38) and the scorn which he heaps on inter-
national lawyers cannot be lightly disregarded.
Judge Ralston's thesis, in brief, is that international law failed because
it took a fiction-the State-as the unit of the community whose relations
it aspired to regulate. In seeking to turn this fiction into a reality and in
proceeding to worship it, international law forgot the individual, the only
reality composing the nation or the state. In the author's opinion, human
beings rather than States should be treated as units of international law;
the same rules of morality should apply to the conduct of nations as obtain
in the relations of man to man, because the multiplication of the units of
law-of all law- namely men, into societal groups does not change the
fundamental characteristics of human intercourse as governed by natural
law. As expressed by judge Ralston, international law ought to be the law
of peoples and not of rulers (p. 44). It is in the light of this thesis that
fundamental concepts of international law are dissected and rejected: the
State, as the unit; its attributes- sovereignty, independence and equality:
the laws of war and of neutrality; and the more dramatic incidents of inter-
national relations - intervention, the assertion of national and vital interests
and imperialism.
The author's underlying thesis that international law cannot accomplish
anything because it runs contrary to the "natural law" governing individuals
has already been expounded - less forcefully perhaps - in his Democracy's
International Law. Do the distressing events of the last decade give sup-
port to his claim that anarchy may be avoided in the international com-
munity by piercing the corporate veil of the State and looking behind it to
the individual? The suggestion is certainly attractive at first glance: it
appeals to the humanitarian instinct. But how far are Judge Ralston's
fundamental postulates founded in reality? Is it true that the State or
nation, or any other organized group, is nothing more than the simple
mathematical aggregate of the individuals who compose it, and that if their
activity to accomplish a desired objective or their mental reaction to a given
issue could be reduced to pounds or inches, it would add up to nothing
more and nothing less than the sum total of what each of the individuals
are capable or willing to exert? My observation induces me to believe that
in association, even of small groups of very rational men and women, in-
dividuality is to a large extent lost and the action or reaction of the group
in most instances differs substantially from that which would have obtained
if the individual had not been subjected to that mysterious and unfortunately
unascertainable influence which, in a crowd, seems to work certain trans-
formations on the human mind. I am not only thinking here of what is
rudely called "mob-psychology" which induces otherwise sensible people to
cry themselves hoarse when they assemble before the Palazzo Venetia in
Rome to hear their Prime Minister or gather in Madison Square Garden
for a meeting of the America First Committee or of the Committee to
Defend America by Aiding the Allies. What I have in mind is rather a
small group of select persons, pursuing a common objective, knowing each
other and getting along fairly well- let us say, the members of a university
class or the faculty of a university department. Surely, they are different
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in group and in individual relationships; and it is not too far-fetched to
say that the larger, the more mingled, the more indeterminate the group,
the wider is the gulf between the group as a whole and the aggregate of its
components.
Then Judge Ralston repeatedly urges us to apply the same rules of
morality and conduct to relations between States as are accepted for regulat-
ing the intercourse between individuals (p. 33) ; he believes that much would
be gained if nations would act as gentlemen act in private life (pp. 9, 84).
Again, on its face, this suggestion is entitled to unqualified endorsement.
But are the "rules of morality" the same or even approximately the same
in all parts of the world? Assuredly not. For instance, I understand that
the Japanese regard it the highest honor to die in battle for the Emperor,
whereas the burden of Judge Ralston's book is to awaken people to the
imbecility of war. Which, then, of the "rules of morality" would be applied
to the world at large: those prevailing in Japan, or those prevailing in the
United States? In this connection, passing reference may be made to Judge
Ralston's belief that few, if any, of the "plain citizens" of England, France
and Germany had "the slightest desire" to go to the war which now rages
in Europe (p. 73). The finding undoubtedly applies to England and France;
but no one who saw Germany in the years preceding September, 1939 can
earnestly contend that the German people did not want this war. It is likely
that there were perhaps a considerable number of people in Germany who
looked with apprehension at the possibility of a war; but the majority very
decidedly did want the war.
And what about this gentlemanly behavior? The first thing which comes
to mind is again the wide difference in outlook as to what is required of
a gentleman -let us say in Italy, or in Japan, or in the United States.
Which of the accepted requirements shall apply in the society of nations?
The fact that Greater Germany's Foreign Minister stated as one of his
country's war aims the destruction of "gentlemefi" in the world might be
disregarded were it not for Judge Ralston's citation of Holland, Denmark,
Sweden and Norway as illustrations of gentlemanly attitudes of nations (p.
110).
There are other aspects of Judge Ralston's arguments which invite doubts.
I suppose the utilitarian theory is as acceptable a foundation of law as can
be found. Yet the greatest benefit for the common man need not he con-
ceived in economic formulas exclusively. The author states the issues in
those terms only. The ills of international society are traced to protective
tariffs and other barriers to free trade and to the struggle for control over
natural resources (p. 95 if) ; the Versailles Treaty is criticized primarily
from the economic point of view (see Chapter XIII, p. 141 if) ; the
source of imperialism, in its most blatant form -i.e. colonial possessions
-is found in the desire to control trade and natural resources and supplies
of cheap labor (p. 162). The pattern on which the author would fashion
a better international society is the United States where the absence of
strife is explained on the ground of absence of barriers to free trade. Vith-
out in any way belittling the tremendous importance of economic factors
as sources of wars, declared and undeclared, it is submitted that the causes
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of so many bloody struggles cannot be reduced to as simple and tangible
a formula as an export-import balance. If- it is true, even in a limited sense,
that the State or Nation is merely an aggregate of the individuals who
compose it, then surely Judge Ralston will concede that the motives of men
in breaching the municipal law against murder or theft, are not always
economic. Indeed the French, who always were masters of fine legal dis-
tinctions, created in their law of homicide the category of "crime de passion"
which, because of the very absence of any sordid economic motive, is treated
differently from ordinary murder. I should not like to be misunderstood
as endorsing war as a method of settling controversy between states, but
it seems to me that if the reasons for the wars in the course of many thousands
of years of history are as simple as Judge Ralston appears to think, then
inability or unwillingness to put an end to wars proves nothing but the
infinite and incurable foolishness of the human race.
I found this book interesting and entertaining because of its vigorous style
and the obvious sincerity of its criticism, much of which is perfectly true
and to a large measure justified. But as an answer to the solution for which
we all search, it gives but little satisfaction. The world which the author
envisages is not one which we ourselves, our children or grandchildren may
hope to live to see, but one which may come, perhaps, after centuries of
purposeful education designed to change human nature, which is funda-
mentally predatory, selfish, covetous and often cruel. Education heretofore
has done little to change human nature, except by incantation. Something
more than the absence of trade barriers will be necessary to induce the
nations of the world to follow the example of the United States. For
myself, I should like to believe that economic aspirations were not the sole
consideration which led to the establishment of this union but that there were
other motives of a more lofty nature which continue to operate with suffi-
cient strength to make it worthwhile for us to defend, if necessary, the land,
the institutions and the way of life the American people have chosen in
the pursuit of their happiness -however imperfect they may be.
FRANcis DEAKt
How To PROVE A PRIMA FActE DEFENSE. By Howard Milton Spellman.
New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1941. Pp. xv, 602. $6.50.
THaIs volume shows the result of research and industry. The author sets
out to indicate how prima facie defenses to various causes of action may be
proven to assist "the neophyte at the Bar" and the established lawyer. He
furnishes a starting point for further research by the citation of leading
cases. The author sums up the fundamental object of his work in this
sentence: "In short, the basic purpose of the present volume is to make
available to the legal profession a practical working tool for use in preparing
for trial and in preliminary interviewing of clients." The book deals with
tAssistant Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
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certain specified defenses and situations common to many defenses, setting
forth the questions which the author believes it necessary to be asked.
From the author's statement that his book is not designed merely for
the purpose of "assisting the neophyte at the Bar," the question suggests
itself: What is its practical utility to the busy working lawyer? For a
lawyer not a neophyte would have small patience and less time for the
reading of a book which tells him how to ask: "Q.: Are you the defendant
in this case?"; "Q.: What is your business or occupation?", etc. I doubt
whether this book would be of mtich use to the actual practitioner. If a
lawyer does not already know, for example, what constitutes failure of
consideration or "contributory negligence," or what is "condonation" in
a divorce case, and so on, I think he would turn to a fundamental treatise
on the substantive law.
Having determined exactly what are the elements of a defense in any
particular action, no lawyer who is qualified to take the case need be told
the exact form in which the questions should be asked. The oral interro-
gation of witnesses in court, whether in cross-examination or in direct, is
surely not a mechanical performance. It is not something which can be
performed by rote. What to ask, what not to ask, how much and how
little to ask depend, n9t only upon the mastery of the law of the case, but
upon a complete understanding of the facts communicated to the lawyer
by his client. But even this is not enough. No lawyer goes into a case
knowing all the facts. There are many facts which his client does not know.
There are many situations about which the lawyer in the trial of his case
must make a shrewd guess. Knowledge of the law and of such facts as he
can learn before going into court is only the ground work, the foundation
of the lawyer's effort in the trial of the action. These are the fundamentals.
How and in what way he will use them depend upon experience, ability
and perception.
Much has been written about the art of cross-examination. The art of
direct examination, though less dramatic, is of at least equal importance
and commands at least equal talent and finesse. I do not think that these
things can be learned out of any law book as a matter of fact, or can they
be taught by a professor. Legal treatises, of course, are essential, but how
to ask a question either on direct or cross-examination can be learned only
through experience.
The book is the conscientious effort of this lawyer-author to pass along
to others practical hints which his experience has already taught him.
Perhaps some lawyers might find it useful. It would undoubtedly be sug-
gestive to a lawyer who has had but little experience in court and has never
had a case involving any of the defenses here discussed.
LLOYD PAUL STRYKERt
tMember of the New York Bar.
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